If you were playing a word association game, Brazil and the Asia Pacific probably wouldn’t spring to mind
Nevertheless, the world’s sixth largest economy has a multilateral agenda bent on reform which may have more regional implications than its increasing trade
Mutlilateralism has been the key component of Brazil’s reformist strategy, however rather than a diplomatic middle power approach, it has adopted a more antagonistic strategy aimed at increasing its influence at key institutions such as the UN, WTO, and G-20
Brazil is challenging the legitimacy of the existing world order because it favours a multi-polar and pluralist system – it not only wants to reconfigure the system and its key organisations, but also to re-distribute economic weight towards itself and its IBSA partners
This form of institutional balancing could be seen as an opportunistic grab for influence in the face of weaker US economic power, but it could also backfire if it weakens the institutions themselves
It’s unlikely however, that Brazil will successfully shift the institutional balance of power, but it may be able to insert itself into their governance arrangements which could create procedural change – unlike its relationships with the other BRICs, IBSA’s democratic values and need for greater trade flows should result in a less confrontational stance
Through its desire for significant UNSC reform as well as a permanent seat, Brazil has sought closer ties with China, its main destination for exports as well as its main bilateral trade partner, and managed to become one of the few Latin American states that China has established a ‘strategic partnership’ with
While it may be working tirelessly to sell the global South its vision, it nevertheless needs to keep the North on side too
This has seen it position itself as a neoliberal-friendly, value-creating and constructive force for reform as well as a North-South mediator – this ‘selfless’ veneer has successfully provided greater institutional access
President Rouseff however, hasn’t maintained President Lula’s activist foreign policy, she is faced with poor approval ratings, corruption, a struggling economy, and is yet to implement reforms to improve Brazil’s productivity and international competitiveness to attract much needed FDI for the upcoming World Cup and Olympic
Ironically, Chinese exports may also soon push Brazil out of markets where it once dominated, particularly its high tech and industrial sectors
Consequently, she is looking to make inroads into the US market, its largest source of FDI, putting Brazil in a similar position to many other Asia Pacific states, in that it must straddle the US and China, however it is more a game of balancing increasingly competitive Chinese MNC’s with American firms as it struggles to maintain domestic demand
To date, it has dealt with this rather clumsily
Moreover, if Brazil’s declining growth does leave it increasingly dependent upon a resurgent US, any grand visions of a new global economic order may need to be put on hold
Photo1: www.marcopolis.net
Photo2: wwwibsa-trilateral.org
Photo3: www.bricsindia.in

Reblogged this on msamba.
It will be really interesting to see where Brazil is heading to. More on the US/EU side or China? Hopefully, as a balancing act somewhere in between. I have also written a bit about Brazil and RtoP http://conflictandsecurity.wordpress.com/2012/08/28/brazils-rwp-an-attempt-to-build-trust-for-the-flayed-concept-of-rtop/
It’s an interesting one, I’ve read quite a few papers suggesting Brazil might be losing its window, in which case that may push it further and further towards US